

Artistic Creativity between Freud, Deleuze and Thomas Nagel

Abstract. Artists frequently perceive their own creative process as if coming from the outside, and feel they have no control over the work they create. The present paper will consider three very different perspectives on this paradox. Psychoanalytic explorations in music point to the loosening of the boundaries between ourselves and the outside world, and internal-external ambiguity as a constant in artistic creation/reception. On a different tack, Gilles Deleuze stresses impersonal and pre-individual agents in art. A work of art is a machine with a degree of involuntary automatic expression and is capable of generating its reality beyond that associated with the particularity of the artist. Sensations, percepts and affects are independent of the state of those who experience them, and that holds for the creator, the performer and the listener alike. The creator acts rather like a conduit for the forces of the Universe. In contradistinction to such monistic views, we can recognize the existential gap between the subjective and objective. Thomas Nagel highlights the following paradox: in order to be objective, we abandon our personal perspectives, but then, we cannot be objective because these personal perspectives are also part of the world. It may be so that of all human activities, art, creativity, and especially music, go the longest way toward closing that gap. Whether we explain this by means of the objective self that straddles the two sides or postulate an all-absorbing plane of immanence, or else invoke the psychoanalytic mechanisms of condensation and displacement, remains the bone of contention between thinkers, and the alluring mystery for the creation/enjoyment/appreciation of art.

Keywords: creativity, psychoanalysis, Deleuze, Thomas Nagel.

1. Introduction

There is a common fantasy among composers that their special gifts help them to participate in divine inspiration that floats down from above (Nass 1975).

Artists employ sounds, words, lines and colors to create new worlds. The process is hardly smooth, there are setbacks, moments of frustration, and feelings of one's inadequacy in the task. Yet, it *is* an act of creation, and the artist will at certain moments inevitably experience him- or herself as an omnipotent creator, a demiurge, a god. Few artists are spared a touch of narcissism. At the same time, it is not uncommon for creative individuals to minimize their role in the creative process, and describe it as an externally focused experience.

Consider the following statement by Johannes Brahms: "Straightaway the ideas flow in upon me, directly from God, and not only do I see distinct themes in my mind's eye but they are clothed in the right forms, harmonies and orchestration. Measure by measure the finished product is revealed ... I am in a trance-like condition—hovering between being asleep and awake; I am still conscious but right on the border of losing consciousness, and it is at such moments that inspired ideas to come. All true inspiration emanates from God and He can reveal Himself to us only through that spark of divinity within—through what modern psychologists call the subconscious mind ... I felt I was in tune with the Infinite ..." (Abell 1955: 25). Similar statements have been made by Giacomo Puccini, Max Bruch or Richard Strauss: they copied God's compositions. Giuseppe Tartini copied Devil's. These composers appear to feel that the creative experience is external and that they are not in charge of the process. Admittedly, this sounds quite "19th-centuryish". Imagine Boulez or Milton Babbitt pronouncing statements like this! Yet, I challenge each of us who has done some composing in our lives to give a precise and exhaustive account of our composing process. Can we really pinpoint the origin of every idea, provide a compelling reason for every solution, reduce the entire process to a chain of conscious and rationally explicable decisions, and can we honestly claim that the process of creation has never taken us to the realms we have not initially envisaged? It is safe to say that we are not always masters of our work. For more than a hundred years now, we have not been hearing much about divine inspiration, but we do hear creators speak about chance. What I have in mind is not aleatorics or improvisation, but something in the nature of the following statement by the Anglo-Irish painter Francis Bacon: "I wanted to make a picture of a bird alighting on a field, but the lines I had drawn suddenly *took on a kind of independence* [emphasis mine] and suggested something different, the man under the umbrella" (quoted in Deleuze 2002: 156). It is not that leaving something to chance is the artist's own creative decision. He is subject to chance happenings, by impersonal powers ostensibly outside of his control.¹

¹ Here the word "chance" can serve as a placeholder for a number of related concepts like serendipity, coincidence, chance, randomness and unpredictability, as discussed by Margaret Boden (2004).

In a similar vein, the prominent theorist of social systems Niklas Luhmann says: “Most of the time, artists are in no position to provide a satisfactory account of their intentions ... The first impulse is never the artist’s ‘own’ intention ... but something one attributes to the artist as intention when observing the work ... Even the artist can see what he wanted only upon realizing what he has done. He is involved in the creation of the work primarily as observer or, physically, as a skilled handyman” (Luhmann 2000: 25). This is seconded by Deleuzian scholar Simon O’Sullivan: “The work of art speaks back to the artist, as it were, or appears to come ‘from somewhere else’” (O’Sullivan 2006: 68).

Generally, the creators are keenly aware of the credit they claim for the creation, and at the same time lack awareness of the exact source of their ideas, and even disclaim their own role in the process. I am not trying to resolve this paradox. Instead, my present aim is to discuss three of the many possible directions in which we can reflect on it. The first of these directions is psychoanalysis in the Freudian tradition. Then, the discussion moves to a different plane, with two philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Thomas Nagel. What are the relationships between these three thinkers? Deleuze is rather critical of Freud, Nagel does not refer to psychoanalysis. The two philosophers belong to two different philosophical traditions, Continental and analytic, respectively, and they appear oblivious to each other’s work. Clearly, the directions I have chosen diverge, and considerably so. The advantage of such an approach is that it illuminates the object of inquiry from different angles. At the same time, it teaches us an important lesson, namely, how hard that nut is to crack. Approach from whichever side you will, it will not give up its secrets.

2. Psychoanalytic perspective

If the verbal analysis of dreams paves a royal road to the unconscious, music provides an aural road to the same destination (Nagel 2008: 526).

When in 1911 Arnold Schoenberg stated that art belongs to the unconscious (quoted in Auner 1997: 113) he may not have been quite accurate, but the statement is important as an early indication of the awareness of the link existing between music and the unconscious mind. Substantial research² demonstrates isomorphism between musical structures and processes, and the unconscious process that is termed “primary” in Freud’s topographic model of the mind. The primary process is generally described as preverbal, pleasure-oriented, seeking immediate discharge of tension; it is contrasted to the secondary process, which is reality-oriented, involves verbal-conceptual mental faculties, formal logic, and constitutes a later phase in individual development. Mental organization ruled by the primary process is characteristic of early infancy but survives in adulthood, generally as the deep unconscious strata of our mental structure. These strata, however, reveal themselves in certain situations, especially in dreams (Freud’s “royal road to the unconscious”), myths, and art. Primary-process mechanisms—condensation, displacement, representation of objects *pars pro toto*, fragmentation—are regularly found in various dimensions of music: thematic procedures, large-scale formal processes, elaborations of fundamental structures etc. (Zatkalik & Kontić 2013; 2015). Gilbert Rose (2004), a musically competent therapist, links music with the interplay between the primary and secondary processes.³

A plausible explanation of this connection could begin with acknowledging the paramount importance of auditory sensations in infancy, even in the prenatal period. In these earliest periods of life, the world is represented largely through auditory images, and powerful primordial affect are associated with them.⁴ Sound is crucial for communication between mother and infant, sustaining it even when the mother is not within sight: we could say that it enables the child to exercise a kind of “magic control”. The surrounding world—parents and other caregivers—adapt to the children’s needs, and given (as we shall discuss presently) the child’s sense of being one with them, it is clear how, firstly, the sense of narcissism and omnipotence emerges,⁵ and secondly, how sound fits in that process.

² Ernst Kris, Heinz Kohut, Stuart Feder, Pinchas Noy, Jullie Jaffe Nagel, and Gilbert Rose are just a few of the names.

³ Rational construction, conscious decisions, self-reflection, knowledge and culture: all these aspects of the secondary process are of equal importance, but they have been soft-pedalled here because of the special role the unconscious plays in internal-external ambiguity.

⁴ These vitality affects, as Daniel Stern calls them (1998; 2010), “do not fit in our existing lexicon or taxonomy of affects. These elusive qualities are better captured by dynamic, kinetic terms, such as ‘surging’, ‘fading away’, ‘fleeting’, ‘explosive’, ‘*crescendo*’, ‘*decrescendo*’ [emphasis mine], ‘bursting’, ‘drawn out’” (Stern 1998: 54).

⁵ It is not possible at this time to go into details about infantile narcissism. Even if some of its aspects are controversial, the concept in general has been well studied by Freud, who introduced the term “primary narcissism” (1914); alternative approaches

Music activates archaic mental states: for Ernst Kris this was “regression in the service of the ego” (Kris 1952; more recently re-actualized in Knafo 2002). Julie Nagel talks about the integration of mental polyphony and claims that “sonic signifiers have the capacity to evoke latent fantasies and screen memories, to *link psychic past with present* [emphasis mine], affect with an idea, feeling with meaning” (Nagel 2010: 653). According to Rose, this entails a degree of fusing of subject and object (Rose 2004: 190), of the sensed and the sensing, echoing the original oneness with the mother (Ibid.: 20).

This connects with the decisive point of my argument. The archaic experience of the world includes what (on Romain Rolland’s suggestion) Freud called the *oceanic feeling*: the feeling of fusion with the external world, without a clear distinction between the internal and external realities, as, for instance, when the infant experiences its cry as coming from the outside (Niederland 1958: 493). It is only during later stages of development that the boundaries between ourselves and the surrounding world, between I and not-I, become clear.

Musical inspiration and composition imply the ability to be open, to shift into and out of these archaic, more loosely organized states of consciousness, and to fluctuate between primary and secondary processes.⁶ It is no accident that music more often than other arts induces the “aesthetic peak experience”, described by Robert Panzarella (1980). It involves the feeling that our own boundaries are dissolving⁷ and that we are merging with the work of art, thus approaching the primordial oceanic feeling. This relates chiefly to the listener, but similar mechanisms can be involved in the creative process itself. Becoming “more primitive and bodily oriented, towards a primary process functioning” (Salomonsson 1989: 130–31), the creator approaches the point at which the external and internal sources of inspiration are indistinguishable.

To sum up the psychoanalytic portion of this essay, we can assert that:

- the roots of music reach back to the earliest infancy and even pre-natal period; hence,
- music bears many traits of the mental functioning pertaining to these developmental stages, viz. close connection with the unconscious mind etc.;
- it is capable of conjuring archaic mental states; opening our minds toward them;
- these archaic mental states include both the sense of omnipotence and internal/external ambiguity;
- it follows that music gives the creator both the sense of unlimited possibilities and of ambiguity as to who is creating.

3. Deleuzian perspective

Music liberates sonorous affect of all ties to the specific bodies whose territory they form (Vernon 2014: 62).

Let us now recall the statement made by Francis Bacon about his lines becoming independent from his will and intentions. By quoting this statement in his study, the paramount thinker of creativity, French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, strips artists of their creators’ prerogatives, and shows their inability to control their work. Artistic creation is a-personal and a-subjective. Anne Sauvagnargues aptly formulates this Deleuzian view: “We must stop attributing a book to an author, to a personal subject, and consider it a textual machine (Sauvagnargues 2013: 91);” a sound machine when we extend this idea to music.

For Deleuze artists are inventors and creators of affects (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 175); a work of art is a monument composed of percepts, affects and blocks of sensations (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 176). The affect, however, is a pre-personal category (Guattari 1990: 66). To become an author is to reach this a-personal point.⁸ “Percepts are ... independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects ... go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are *beings* whose validity lies in them-

were propounded by Melanie Klein, Heinz Kohut, Karen Horney, and many more; see also Britton (1998, especially 161–76).

⁶ Arguably, these liminal states, when the conscious and unconscious somehow become indistinguishable are of particular importance for creation. As Arthur Koestler says, “the most fertile region seems to be the marshy shore, the borderland between sleep and full awakening—where the matrices of disciplined thought are already operating but have not yet sufficiently hardened to obstruct the dreamlike fluidity of imagination” (Koestler 1964: 210). Recall Brahms “hovering between being asleep and awake” (or, for that matter, Coleridge writing *Kubla Khan* in an opium-induced reverie, or—scientific creativity also counts—Friedrich von Kekulé discovering the benzene structural formula while dozing by the fire).

⁷ David Schwartz reminds us of goosebumps that such an experience gives us: our skin reacts, our boundary against the external world! (Schwartz 1997: 8).

⁸ We also need to be reminded of Deleuze’s indebtedness to Nietzsche, for whom the personal is only an expression of the impersonal will to power.

selves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation ... it exists in itself” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 164).

To understand this, we need to engage with broader questions about Deleuze’s aesthetics, which is in turn inseparable from his ontology. If done properly, this task is far beyond the scope of this essay. We can only scratch the surface, with the help of Manuel Delanda who talks about three dimensions of Deleuze’s ontology, the virtual, the intensive, and the actual (extensive) (Delanda 2002: 51). The virtual is closely related to chaos: “Chaos is not a nothingness but a *virtual* [original emphasis] containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 118). This is important because artistic creation for Deleuze is a productive encounter with chaos: “Art takes a bit of chaos and puts it into a frame in order to form a composed chaos that becomes sensory” (Ibid.). Rather than being an omnipotent creator, the artist may be responsible for casting a net, or a sieve over chaos and be vigilant to the possibilities that then emerge. Philosophy, science and art share the vibratory force of the universe, of chaos, says Elizabeth Grosz (Grosz 2008: 61). To harness the cosmic forces, to render invisible forces visible and inaudible forces audible: this is the task common to the painter, the musician, and the writer (Deleuze 2002: 63–64).

From this engagement with chaos, as the structuring of the space of possibilities arises the field of intensities. It is a dynamic field of densities, velocities, and heat, defined by differential relations (the rate of change of these parameters) and by singularities (thresholds at which the dynamic system dissolves). The task of the creator (again, rather than being a locus of omnipotence) is “to maintain the flow of matter-energy, thereby maintaining intensive differences alive” (Delanda 2002: 66). The individuals populating the actual (extensive) world would then be like “the discontinuous spatial or metric structures which condense out of a nonmetric, virtual continuum” (Delanda 2002: 51), or as Deleuze himself says: “The individual [is] established first of all around a certain number of local singularities ... That is the real definition of the individual: *concentration, accumulation, coincidence of a certain number of converging pre-individual singularities*” [original italic] (Deleuze 1993: 63); it expresses “intense and differentiated pre-individual singularities” (Zepke 2005: 156). “Art goes to the beginning of the process of individuation: it captures nonorganic forces and seizes the processes of intensity prior to stabilized form” (Sauvagnargues 2013: 58).

There is another way in which creation exceeds the personal and subjective. Art for Deleuze is an immediate coupling of material to sensation (Gallope 2008: 109). It is by means of the material that art can wrest the percept from the perception and affect from the affection (perceptions and affections being associated with the personal, individual). No longer is the artist at the center, the privileged position is given to material. Deleuze talks about “... the percept or affect of the material itself, the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, and the ascent of Gothic stone ... it is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and the sensation begins” (Deleuze 1994: 166).

In this way, according to Barbara Bolt, he “overturns the humanist tradition ... which structures the human as transcendent and separate from *bios* and *techne* ... Deleuze and Guattari redefine boundaries between the animal, human and technological” (Bolt 2010: 277–78). Being expresses the mineral, the animal, the human, the cosmic, and the divine in a single voice, on the same plane. This is a philosophy of nonorganic life, a philosophy of univocity and immanence, clearly relying on Spinoza: a major influence on Deleuze’s thought.

According to yet another Deleuze scholar “We do not exist as subjects who then express themselves; rather, life produces certain modes of expression such as painting, writing, speaking, moving, sculpting, building and dancing, and each style of expression produces its own subject. There is no unified life or subject prior to its specific expressions” (Colebrook 2006: 108).

Thus, instead of an omnipotent creator, we have the art-machine coupled with the subject-machine. The machine, in the words of Darren Ambrose, “possesses a degree of involuntary automatic expression, and is capable of generating its own reality beyond that associated with the particularity of the artist. By mobilizing the strategies of automatism, art is able to participate in a form of creation that is closer to autopoietic vitalism of life”⁹ (Ambrose 2012: 179).

⁹ The connection with Henry Bergson’s *elan vital* here becomes obvious.

4. Nagelian perspective

Methods needed to understand ourselves do not yet exist (Nagel 1986: 10).

Let us now proceed on a different tack, yet still addressing the complexities of relations between the subject and object, the internal and external realities, the personal and the impersonal. The issues I am raising now can be formulated within a realm that ranges from psychology to epistemology to ontology. To foreshadow the ensuing discussion, let us begin with the following: given such a particular person as me, how is it possible to combine the perspective of that particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included? In other words, I am the center of the world, and I contemplate that world which includes myself contemplating the world of which I am a part, and so on to infinity. Hardly any philosopher failed to address such questions. Had we unlimited space, we could be discussing Paul Ricœur's questioning of the autonomy of the self, emphasizing that the self is constructed through the interaction with others (*Oneself as Another*, as the title of his book reads). Or we could be talking about Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject, Husserl's transcendental ego; or we might take a semiotic turn and investigate the transition between the endo-world and exo-world within Eero Tarasti's existential semiotics; and we could go back to the venerated tradition of Schelling, Hegel and Fichte (and ultimately probably to Plato). Among many approaches, I decided to engage with the American philosopher Thomas Nagel, who in the ninety-seventies and eighties drew considerable attention with his book *The View from Nowhere* (1986), and the article "How it is to be a bat" (1974).

Nagel recognizes that the internal–external tension pervades human life (Nagel 1986: 6). This entails the following paradox: in order to be objective we abandon our perspectives, but then, we cannot be objective because these personal perspectives are also part of that same world we are trying to observe objectively. Being objective implies conceiving the world as centerless, yet I can conceive of it only from my point of view. But if the world is truly centerless, then there is no such a thing as *me*, because that entity could not conceive of the world otherwise than with itself at the center. In other words, a *centerless* world would possibly imply the exclusion of any subjectivity (science aspires to this). We can never achieve such a view as it will always be refracted through our own subjectivity, but Nagel hopes we can at least conceive it.

As a path toward such a goal, he postulates an instance he calls the objective self.¹⁰ The objective self should be able to deal with experiences from any point of view. It receives those of, say, Miloš Zatkalik directly, but it "treats them on an equal footing with those others it learns about only indirectly; [the objective self is] a perspectiveless subject that constructs a centerless conception of the world by casting all perspectives into the content of that world" (Nagel 1986: 62). It requires that we find within ourselves the capacity to view the world in some sense as very different creatures also might view it when abstracting from the specifics of their type of perspective.¹¹ Each of us, in addition to being an ordinary person, is a particular objective self, the subject of a perspectiveless conception of reality (Nagel 1986: 63). The objective view must be something more and something different than the totality of subjective individual views: it is an integration of these individual views: a transcending intelligence, which can encompass all those subjective views and somehow synthesize them. What happens "in the pursuit of objectivity is that a certain element of oneself, the impersonal or objective self, which can escape from the specific contingencies of one's creaturely point of view, is allowed to predominate" (Nagel 1986: 9). So, "I am both the logical focus of an objective conception of the world and a particular being in that world who occupies no central position whatever" (Nagel 1986: 64). That creates the new problem of reintegration, the problem of how to incorporate these results into the life and self-knowledge of an ordinary human being. One has *to be* that same creature who has been subjected to detached examination (Nagel 1986: 9, 66).

In what ways is this pertinent to the topic of creativity? Artistic creation is not his principal field but the paradoxes he discusses reflect on how we make sense of creative work, perhaps even the ways in which we create.

The creator is engaged in a most subjective activity, yet forced to appraise his or her work objectively, as if from the outside. This external/objective assessment of my work can be twofold: the assessment that I can

¹⁰ To my mind, it remains somewhat unclear whether this is a factual existence, a hypothetical construct; or perhaps an ethical category, some kind of moral obligation: he teaches ethics after all.

¹¹ And not only human: in his famous study he wants to assume the perspective of a bat!

plausibly ascribe to another subject, and the assessment I make in the objective mode, via the objective self (to the extent that I can assume the objective stance) (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. External judgement of one's work

The first is multi-centered, the second—even as the title of Nagel's book reads—“the view from nowhere”, centerless; the first is more empirical, based on my experience with people, the second, while inevitably including experience, more theoretical; the first based primarily on my knowledge of people, which further subdivides into the knowledge of particular persons, and a more general view of the way people judge one another, constrained by my (in)ability to assume somebody else's point of view; the second involves broader knowledge of the world, which again includes my assessment of the people. In other words, the distinction (by no means clear-cut) is between how I can think of other people judging my work, as opposed to an objective, impartial judgment of it; but in the first case, other people's judgments can be thought of either as subjective and partial or through their objective selves.

There is, thus, an attitude that cuts through the opposition between transcendent universality and parochial self-absorption (Nagel 1986: 222). It can be directed to all kinds of things, but very importantly, it is conspicuous as an element in aesthetic response. Nagel recognizes that the experience of great beauty tends to unify the self: the object engages us immediately and totally, in a way that makes distinctions among points of view irrelevant. He is skeptical whether one could sustain such an attitude consistently in everyday life. It would require an immediacy of feeling and attention to what is present that does not blend well with the complex, forward-looking pursuits of a civilized creature (Nagel 1986: 222–23). But then, let us add, music does possess that kind of immediacy.

This said we are braced for a few concluding words.

5. Conclusions

It transpires that the three rather different sets of mental coordinates wherein we have successively located ourselves, in some ways converge. The labor of the arts, and music in particular, is directed toward the closing of the existential gap between the subjective and objective, internal and external. The thinkers herein invoked, admittedly, concerned themselves more with the receiving than the producing end, with listeners, viewers and readers rather than creators. Creation, while operating under a similar regime, carries a surplus, or a kind of dark background, which remains elusive and impenetrable. This holds true even when we approach the matter from innumerable other possible angles, some of them vastly different but still fruitful or at least legitimate. Even as we probe into the tenebrous depths of creativity, it is precisely the elusiveness that we need to cherish.

We will end with a reframing of the paradox involved within a broader humanistic perspective: music is something made by people and for people; it is moreover indispensable in human life; there is no culture and no people without music. This makes music deeply humanistic. Yet, we have somehow concluded that music is not there for us: it is at the same time a-humanistic. Humans, creators and perceivers alike, are then rather like conduits for the forces of the Universe. Adding a Spinozistic touch refracted through a Deleuzian prism and formulated by Stephen Zepke, “in place of the human subjective emotions is an inhuman intellectual love that surpasses them, the impersonal joy of God/Nature as it affirms and expresses itself” (Zepke 2005: 72).

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Meninė kūryba tarp Freudo, Deleuze'o ir Thomaso Nagelio

Santrauka

Menininkas yra blaškomas tarp visagalybės pojūčio, buvimo Kūrėju / Demiurgu / Dievu jausmo ir, priešingai, buvimo kūrybinės jėgos, esančios anapus / aukščiau / išorėje, priemone, tuo pačiu prarandant savąjį *aš*, ir blaškomas tarp narcisizmo bei savęs naikinimo. Dėl šio dviprasmiškumo menininkai kartais žvelgia į savo kūrybinį procesą tarsi iš išorės. Jie praranda kontrolę savo kūriniai ir jis įgauna autonominių gyvenimą.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjami trys labai skirtingi požiūriai į šį paradoksą. Analizė pradedama nuo seniai nusistovėjusio gilaus ryšio tarp muzikos ir pašmonės. Nuo Freudo proto modelių iki Ernsto Kriso regeso tarnaujant ego, iki mūsų laikų, kai tokie mokslininkai, kaip Gilbertas Rose'as, priskyre žmogaus protui gebėjimą svyruoti tarp pirminių ir antrinių procesų, mes ne kartą tapome ribų tarp savęs ir išorinio pasaulio nykimo liudininkais, o vidinį / išorinį dviprasmiškumą ilgainiui ėmėme suvokti kaip meninės kūrybos / receptijos konstantą.

Vienas svarbiausių kūrybiškumo filosofų Gilles'is Deleuze'as, žvelgdamas visiškai iš kitos perspektyvos, pabrėžia beasmenius ir ikiindividualius mene funkcionuojančius veiksnius. Mene kūrinys yra mašina, turinti tam tikrą nevalingą automatinę išraiškos laipsnį, galintį sukurti savo tikrovę, kuri nėra susijusi su menininko savybėmis. Taip menas įgyja galią dalyvauti kūrybos formoje, artimoje autopoetiniam gyvenimo vitalizmui (Ambrose). Pojūčiai, suvokimai ir afektai nepriklauso nuo juos patiriančių asmenų būsenos – tai galioja tiek kūrėjui, tiek atlikėjui, tiek klausytojui. Menas kartu su filosofija ir mokslu tarsi įtempia sietelį virš chaoso. Menininkas yra atsakingas už įtempimą, jis turi budriai stebėti iš viso to atsirandančias galimybes. Atsakomybė individuali, tačiau individualumą lemia intensyvūs ir diferencijuoti ikiindividualūs ypatumai, kuriuos išreiškia menininkas (Zepke). Jis veikia tarsi Visatos jėgų kanalas. Kaip tvirtina Deleuze'as, subjektyvias žmogaus emocijas jis pakeičia jas pranokstančia nežmogiška intelektine meile, beasmeniu Dievo / Gamtos džiaugsmu.

Galiausiai, jei tai kyla iš spinozinio vieningumo, kai Būtis išreiškia mineralą, gyvūną, žmogų, kosmiškąjį ir dieviškąjį, vienu balsu toje pačioje plotmėje, mes galime atpažinti egzistencinį atotrūkį tarp subjektyvumo ir objektyvumo. Thomas Nagelis pabrėžia paradoksą: norėdami būti objektyvūs, mes atsisakome savo asmeninių perspektyvų, bet tada negalime būti objektyvūs, nes šios asmeninės perspektyvos taip pat yra pasaulio dalis.

Gali būti taip, kad iš visų žmogaus veiklų menas, kūryba, o ypač muzika eina ilgiausiu keliu, kad panaikintų šią spragą. Klausimai, ar mes tai turėtume aiškinti objektyviau *aš*, kuris apima abi šio paradokso puses, ar postuluoti viską sugeriančią imanencijos plokštumą, ar pasitelkti psichoanalitinį kondensacijos ir poslinkio mechanizmą, tebėra mąstytojų ginčų pagrindas ir viliojanti paslaptis, skatinanti kurti ir mėgautis menu.